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PEOPLE v. SHARP: DEATH KNELL FOR PRO SE
REPRESENTATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
IN CALIFORNIA?
Contemporaneously with the latest expansion of the criminal de-
fendant's right to the assistance of counsel,' judicial decision, a con-
stitutional amendment, and legislative enactments in California have re-
cently combined to severely curtail if not eliminate the criminal de-
fendants ability to proceed in propria persona.2 At the primary election
of June 6, 1972, the voters of California adopted Proposition 3,1 amend-
ing the California Constitution. The amendment deleted wording in
the constitution which had been interpreted to give a defendant the
right to defend himself without the aid of counsel.4 The amendment
also authorized the legislature to require the defendant in a felony
case to have the assistance of counsel.5 In addition, several penal code
sections, 6 requiring that the defendant in a capital case be represented
by counsel, became operative on the adoption of the amendment.
7
1. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972) (right to counsel
applies in misdemeanor and petty offense cases if imprisonment may be imposed).
2. In propria persona literally means "Eiln one's own proper person." Pro se
means "[flor himself; in his own behalf; in person." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 899,
1364 (4th ed. 1951).
3. Proposition 3 was a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment of Cal-
ifornia State Senator Cologne on behalf of Attorney General Evelle Youngeg. S.C.A.
42, Cal. Reg. Sess. (1971). Interestingly enough, the measure had the express sup-
port of, among others, the Judicial Council of California, the District Attorneys and
Peace Officers Associations, and Los Angeles County Superior Court, the court from
which People v. Sharp arose. See San Francisco Examiner, June 7, 1972, at D, col. 1,
for a breakdown of the statewide vote count on Proposition 3.
4. Compare CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 13 (1879): "In criminal prosecutions, in any
court whatever, the party accused shall have the right . . . to appear and defend, in
person and with counsel. . . ." with id., as amended June 6, 1972: "In criminal
prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right ... to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense . . . and to be personally present with coun-
sel. . . . The Legislature shall have the power to require the defendant in a felony
case to have the assistance of counsel." See also cases cited in note 9 infra.
5. CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 13, as amended June 6, 1972.
6. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1800, §§ 2-5, at 3897-98.
7. Id. The new constitutional amendment requires representation by counsel
in those cases designated as "capital cases" at the time the foregoing penal code sec-
tions were adopted or modified. The subsequent California Supreme Court decision
holding the death penalty unconstitutional, People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d
880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), and recent passage of a voter initiative favoring re-
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One month later, the California Supreme Court extended the rationale
of Proposition 3 to all criminal cases. The court ruled unanimously in
People v. Sharp8 that there is no federal or state constitutional right to
appear pro se.9
The United States Supreme Court in recent years has laid increas-
ing emphasis on the necessity for the "guiding hand of counsel" to
ensure fundamental fairness to the criminal defendant. 10 In Gideon
v. Wainwright," the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was made
applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause:"'
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our ad-
versary system of criminal justice, any person hailed into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly
spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crime. . . . The right of one charged with crime to
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials
in some countries, but it is in ours.13
instatement of the death penalty do not, therefore, affect the application of the amend-
ment.
8. 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
9. Id. at 453, 499 P.2d at 491, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 235. Sharp distinguished a
long line of decisions finding a state constitutional right of self-representation. See,
e.g., People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 788-89, 336 P.2d 937, 945-46 (1959): "The
foregoing sections [CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1879), CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 686, 858-59,
987 (West 1970)] accord the accused not only a right to counsel but also a right to
represent himself if he so elects. Except in certain situations not here pertinent, the
court cannot force a competent defendant to be represented by an attorney" cited in
People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 419, 455 P.2d 122, 129, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 193
(1969) and People v. Harmon, 54 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 351 P.2d 329, 332, 4 Cal. Rptr. 161,
164 (1960); People v. Hagen, 6 Cal. App. 3d 35, 49, 85 Cal. Rptr. 556, 565 (1970)
("The defendant's constitutional right to be represented by counsel at all stages of the
proceeding, and his constitutional right to represent himself are on a parity."); People
v. Jackson, 186 Cal. App. 2d 307, 315, 8 Cal. Rptr. 849, 853 (1960) ("By constitu-
tional provision and statute an accused is guaranteed the right to be represented by
counsel or to represent himself."); cf. People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 205-08, 417
P.2d 868, 872-74, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288-90 (1966) (indicating that a right of self-
representation is part of procedural due process) (dictum).
However, the court in Sharp concluded that these cases finding a state constitu-
tional right of self-representation had either misinterpreted or taken portions of the
constitutional language out of context, and that the California Supreme Court had never
held, when the question was at issue, that there was a constitutional right to defend
pro se. 7 Cal. 3d at 458-59, 499 P.2d at 495-96, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
10. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1937);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
12. Id. at 342-45.
13. Id. at 344.
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The right is not limited to serious criminal offenses. In Argersinger v.
Hamlin,'4 the Court held that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
a defendant could not be imprisoned even for a misdemeanor or petty
offense unless he was represented by counsel. 15 The Court recognized
that such offenses often involve complex problems 6 and reiterated
the classic observation of Justice Sutherland: "The right to be heard
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel."' 7
However, the Supreme Court has never ruled specifically on the
constitutionality of the correlative right, the right of self-representa-
tion.'8 Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held that the right to
counsel may be knowingly and intelligently waived.19 While "courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental
constitutional rights and "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights," 20 the Supreme Court in Adams v. United States
ex rel. McCann2 held that the right to counsel may be waived if the
accused "knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open": "Whe Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defend-
ant,.
2-q
The ability of a defendant to waive counsel and proceed pro se
has incurred growing disfavor in a judicial system increasingly con-
cerned with inefficiency and the orderly administration of criminal jus-
tice.23 Delays and continuances, occasioned by assertion of a right of
14. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
15. Id. at 37.
16. See id. at 33.
17. Id. at 31, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). Justice
Sutherland went on to say: "Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, gen-
erally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is un-
familiar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much
more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect."
18. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 457, 499 P.2d 489, 494, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233,
238 (1972).
19. E.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1937).
20. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
21. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
22. Id. at 279.
23. Grano, The Right to Counsel, 54 MmN. L. REv. 1175, 1178 (1970). [herein-
after cited as Grano].
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self-representation, are said to hamper the flow of enormous court case-
loads and add to the growing cost of criminal trials. 24  There is also
a fear, in response to the controversial and widely publicized trials of
such figures as Angela Davis or Bobby Seale, that pro se defendants
will abuse their position and disrupt courtroom decorum. 25  In addi-
tion, requests to proceed pro se have been described as routine ploys
used by cunning criminals to force appellate court reversals. 26  These
factors formed the background for the decision in People v. Sharp and
prompted Proposition 3.
The Decision
Sharp was represented in the superior court by a deputy public
defender and was convicted of grand theft.2 7 He appealed the convic-
tion,28 and the court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the trial
court had erroneously denied the defendant's motion to proceed pro se
and, therefore, had deprived Sharp of the right of self-representation. 9
The court of appeals noted that the trial court's inquiry into the defend-
ant's competency to proceed pro se revealed that Sharp was forty-eight
years old, had an eleventh grade education, was articulate, had read
many petitions and law books, and knew the offense of which he was
charged, the lesser included offense, and the punishment which might
be imposed.30 In addition, Sharp had not asked for a continuance
although his motion to proceed pro se was made on the day set for
trial, and the relatively simple facts of the case together with the
defendant's waiver of jury trial indicated that the trial would not be
involved or lengthy.3 The defendant's motion was apparently tac-
24. See, e.g., Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1800, § 6, at 3898: "The Legislature finds that
persons representing themselves cause unnecessary delays in the trials of charges against
them; that trials are extended by such persons representing themselves; and that orderly
trial procedures are disrupted. Self-representation places a heavy burden upon the ad-
ministration of criminal justice without any advantages accruing to those persons who
desire to represent themselves."
25. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CON-
STITUTION, PRIMARY ELECTION, June 6, 1972, at 8: "[T]hrough willful misconduct or
innocent ignorance of procedure, persons representing themselves can seriously dis-
rupt a trial. On occasion such persons have abused and insulted judges and witnesses,
and have done their best to turn their trial into a shambles."
26. See, e.g., People v. Weston, 9 Cal. App. 3d 330, 334-35 & n.4, 87 Cal. Rptr.
922, 924-25 & n.4 (1970); People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 23-24, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 626, 629 (1967).
27. CAL. PEN. CODE § 487 (West 1970).
28. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 451, 499 P.2d 489, 490, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233,
234 (1972).
29. Petition for Hearing at 12, People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489,
103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972) (Appendix A).
30. Id. at 10-12.
31. Id. 11, 12.
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tically motivated, based on a belief that his personal knowledge of the
facts would make his cross-examination of the witnesses more thorough
than that of an attorney.3 2 However, the case came to the California
Supreme Court on a petition for a hearing, and the conviction was
unanimously affirmed."3 The court found that neither the Sixth
Amendment nor due process considerations required that a defendant
be accorded the right of self-representation.3 4 Nor could the right be
found by any rational reading of the state constitution. 5 The court
stated that even an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying a
request to proceed pro se would not result in a reversal except in "very
rare circumstances" where the denial impairs the fairness of trial. 6
Basis for the Decision
The Sixth Amendment
Judicial Precedents
In reaching its decision, the California court noted the absence of
any controlling Supreme Court decision although language in Carter v.
Illinois3 7 is often cited in support of a federal constitutional right of
self-representation:
Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor the vitality it de-
rives from progressive standards of justice denies a person the right
to defend himself. . . . Under appropriate circumstances the Con-
stitution requires that counsel be tendered; it does not require that
under all circumstances counsel be forced upon a defendant. 38
The court concluded that Carter "must be deemed to recognize that
there are circumstances when a defendant must be represented."3 9 The
circumstances which Carter refers to, however, consistently with its
32. Id. 11.
33. 7 Cal. 3d at 451, 499 P.2d at 490, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
34. Id. at 454-57, 459-60, 499 P.2d at 492-94, 496-97, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 236-38,
240-41.
35. Id. at 457, 499 P.2d at 495, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
36. Id. at 460, 462, 499 P.2d at 496, 498, 103 Cal. at 240, 242.
37. 329 U.S. 173 (1946); accord, Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957).
The Supreme Court in Carter cited its decision in United States ex. rel. McCann v.
Adams, 320 U.S. 220 (1943) modifying Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 279 (1942), where the Court stated in dictum that "[t]he right to assistance
of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal for-
malisms. They rest on considerations that go to the substance of an accused's position
before the law." See also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948): "The ab-
sence of that right [of an accused to argue his own appeal] is in sharp contrast to his
constitutional prerogative of being present in person.. . and to his recognized privilege
of conducting his own defense at the trial."
38. 329 U.S. at 174-75.
39. 7 Cal. 3d at 456, 499 P.2d at 494, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
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holding,40 appear to be cases in which the defendant has not knowingly
and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court has
never held that due process may require forcing counsel on an accused
who has knowingly and intelligently waived this right.41  But alterna-
tively, Carter does not appear to give any direct support to a consti-
tutional right to proceed pro se.42
In the federal courts, the right is statutory,43 and the circuits are
split on the question of whether it rises to the status of a constitutional
right.44  The leading case in support of such a right is United States v.
Plattner,45 a Second Circuit decision finding a federal constitutional
right to proceed pro se which is unqualified if invoked prior to trial.
However, it is established that an unequivocal request to proceed pro
se is necessary,46 no notice of the right is required,4 7 the request must
be timely,48 and denial of the request is not reversible error in the ab-
sence of a showing of prejudice.," And, because an election to pro-
40. Carter held that petitioner had not been denied due process since the com-
mon law record before the Court failed to disclose that he had not knowingly and in-
telligently waived his right to counsel. 329 U.S. at 177-79.
41. See Grano, supra note 23, at 1202.
42. See United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009, 1019 (E.D. Tenn. 1966):
"The validity of the deduction that the right to defend oneself without the assistance of
counsel is a constitutional right is questionable. All that has really been said by the
Supreme Court [in Carter] is that the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit the right of
self-representation."
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970). "In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such
courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." See also
FED. R. CIuM. P. 44(a).
44. Compare Van Nattan v. United States, 357 F.2d 161, 164 (10th Cir. 1966),
Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir. 1963) and Brown v. United
States, 264 F.2d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (statutory right of self-representation) with
United States v. Pike, 439 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1971), Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d
100, 103 (7th Cir. 1969), United States v. Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (6th
Cir. 1969) and United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964) (finding a
constitutional right).
45. 330 F.2d 271, 273, 277 (2d Cir. 1964).
46. E.g., United States ex rel. Jackson v. Follette, 425 F.2d 257, 259 (2d Cir.
1970); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965);
United States v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1945).
47. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 16 (2d
Cir. 1965).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 1968) (motion
to proceed pro se after three days of trial denied); United States ex rel. Maldonado v.
Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965): "Once the trial has begun with the defend-
ant represented by counsel, however, his right thereafter to discharge his lawyer and to
represent himself is sharply curtailed."
49. See United States v. Abbamonte, 348 F.2d 700, 704 (2d Cir. 1965). But see
United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964), quoted in United States v.
Pike, 439 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1971): "Thus we would be required to remand the case,
even if no prejudice. . . were shown to have resulted ....
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ceed pro se is a waiver of the right to counsel, the trial court "should
conduct some sort of inquiry bearing upon the defendant's capacity to
make an intelligent choice. . . ."5 Noting these conditions on the
right to waive counsel, the California Supreme Court concluded that
those jurisdictions recognizing a constitutional right of self-representa-
tion "do not accord to such right the same force and vitality as the con-
stitutional right to counsel ..
The Historical Analysis
The examination by the California Supreme Court of the right to
proceed pro se from an historical perspective52 led to the conclusion
that "only vague notions of a fundamental right of self-representation
which predated the federal Constitution" could be discerned in the early
declarations of rights.53 In addition, because self-representation was
the prevailing practice in both England and America in the late eight-
eenth century, the emphasis appears to have been on abrogating the
harsh common law rule denying to the defendant the assistance of
counsel. Therefore, the court in Sharp found no compelling historical
basis for a fundamental right of self-representation. 54
On the other hand, such a basis was found by the Second Circuit
in United States v. Plattner.55 The Second Circuit reasoned that sec-
tion 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,56 giving a right to defend "per-
sonally or by counsel," was passed by the First Congress one day be-
fore the Sixth Amendment was proposed. Thus, section 35 could be
considered a contemporary interpretation of the "terse language" of
the Bill of Rights. 57 And, statutes and rules now in effect 58 give "con-
tinued vitality" to the constitutional right to defend personally. 9 It is
at least arguable that the Sixth Amendment was meant to add the addi-
tional element of a right to counsel to the prevailing practice, and nei-
50. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
51. 7 Cal. 3d at 456, 499 P.2d at 494, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
52. See generally Grano, supra note 23, at 1190-94. The practice of self-
representation was firmly established in precolonial England-the right to counsel be-
ing largely nonexistent. The right to counsel in cases of treason was established by
statute in 1695, and it was not until 1836 that this right became fully available re-
gardless of the charge. In colonial America, self-representation was also commonplace,
but was probably caused in part by a shortage of lawyers. Id. at 1191 & n.86, 1192-93.
53. 7 Cal. 3d at 454, 499 P.2d at 492, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 236. See generally 1
B. ScHwARnz, Tim BILL Op RIGnrrs 140-377 (1971).
54. 7 Cal. 3d at 454, 499 P.2d at 492, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
55. 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964).
56. Ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789).
57. 330 F.2d at 274.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970), quoted at note 43 supra; FED. R. ClM. P. 44(a).
59. 330 F.2d at 275.
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ther the language nor the history of the amendment indicate an in-
tent to retract the common law privilege of self-representation.
Plattner also found support for its position in the majority of state
constitutions.60  While the court in Sharp noted that only four state
constitutions provide a right to defend in person or by counsel, 61
Plattner points out that an additional six states provide a right to be
heard in person or by counsel, or both. 2 At least half of the state
constitutions provide a right to be heard in person and by counsel,6 3 a
provision which many courts have understood to accord a right of self-
representation. 64 Thus, many states have recognized in their constitu-
tions the fundamental character of the right of self-representation.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amentment Guarantees of Due Process
The Analogy to the Singer Decision
In the absence of a compelling historical basis for a fundamental
right of self-representation, the court in Sharp found persuasive author-
ity in the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Singer v. United States65 on
which to base a conclusion that "the right to waive a constitutional pro-
tection is not necessarily a right of constitutional dimensions."66  In
upholding the validity of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, requiring that the government and the court consent to the
waiver of a jury, the Court in Singer rejected petitioner's argument that
he had a constitutional right to insist on waiver when he felt it to be
in his own best interests and stated: "The ability to waive a constitu-
tional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the
opposite of that right.' '6 7r The California Supreme Court likewise rea-
soned that, if neither historical precedents nor due process considera-
tions support a finding of a fundamental right of self-representation,
there must similarly be no constitutional right to insist upon the oppo-
site of the right to counsel. 68
60. Id.
61. 7 Cal. 3d at 457, 499 P.2d at 494, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
62. 330 F.2d at 275.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., State v. Westbrook, 99 Ariz. 30, 35, 406 P.2d 388, 391 (1965);
Williams v. State, 153 Ark. 289, 290, 239 S.W. 1065 (1922); People v. Burson, 11 111.
2d 360, 371-72, 143 N.E.2d 239, 246 (1957); State v. Thomlinson, 78 S.D. 235, 237-38,
100 N.W.2d 121, 122 (1960); State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 287-88, 272 P.2d 195,
199 (1954). See also Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1233 (1961).
65. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
66. 7 Cal. 3d at 455, 499 P.2d at 493, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
67. 380 U.S. at 34-35.
68. See 7 Cal. 3d at 455, 499 P.2d at 493, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 237 where the
court stated that "no sufficient reason appears why the waiver of [the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel] is a constitutional right when the waiver of the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to a jury trial is not."
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However, the Court in Singer did not consider the question of a
waiver of counsel. The Singer court's finding that waiver of jury trial
was an "obscure and insignificant procedure" in the common law with
no general recognition in the colonies, 9 may be contrasted with the
firmly established practice of pro se representation. 70  In addition, the
Court noted in Singer that if the defendant's waiver is refused, he is
subject to the very thing the Constitution guarantees himn.71  But the
Sixth Amendment guarantees only the "assistance" of counsel, and it
has been suggested that this guarantee is significantly different from the
directory language found in the body of the Constitution and in the Sixth
Amendment with regard to jury trials.7"
Procedural Safeguards Ensuring Competent Representation
In rejecting petitioner's due process contentions, the Court in
Singer stated that adequate safeguards such as change of venue and voir
dire surround trial by jury to make it as fair as possible.73 Similarly,
the California court concluded that the general availability of compe-
tent counsel, whose quality of performance is subject to checks and
supervision, affords an accused the opportunity to best defend against
the charges: 74 "[T]here is no longer the same threat of an injustice
which formerly compelled an accused to risk self-representation." 75
Therefore, the right of self-representation is not contained within the
broader concept of due process.7 6
However, the two main procedural safeguards surrounding a trial
with counsel, namely removal of counsel and substitution of another
attorney, and post-conviction relief for incompetency of counsel,7 7 are
available in only very limited circumstances. In California, the sole
statutory authority for removal calls for the consent of the attorney
and his client or for a court order on the application of either party.7"
But the statute has little relevance for the majority of defendants who
69. 380 U.S. at 28, 31.
70. See Grano, supra note 23, at 1190-94.
71. 380 U.S. at 36.
72. Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro
Se Defendant, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1479, 1488 (1971). [hereinafter cited as Self-
Representation in Criminal Trials].
73. 380 U.S. at 35.
74. See 7 Cal. 3d at 460-61, 499 P.2d at 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
75. Id. at 461, 499 P.2d at 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
76. Id.
77. See generally Grano, supra note 23, at 1239-63; Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial
Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases,
59 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 289 (1964); 59 CALi?. L. Rav. 199 (1971).
78. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 284 (West 1972). This statute has been held ap-
plicable in criminal as well as civil cases. In re Martinez, 52 Cal. 2d 808, 813, 345
P.2d 449, 451-52 (1959).
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are indigent79 and, therefore, must rely on assigned counsel or public
defender systems. There is no absolute right to more than one ap-
pointed counsel,8" and the decision whether to allow a substitution of
appointed counsel is within the trial judge's discretion.8" The in-
creased expense to the state in furnishing another appointed counsel
coupled with the likelihood of a delay in the trial weigh heavily against
a decision allowing for the substitution."2  Generally, a lack of rapport
between attorney and client, such as a disagreement over trial tactics
or strategy, is not sufficient to compel a substitution in the absence of
an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel."'
Similarly, post-conviction relief on a claim of incompetency of
counsel is available only if counsel was ineffective. 4 The leading case
in California finding such ineffective assistance at the trial level is
People v. Ibarra85 which held that to justify relief an extreme case
must be shown. The trial must be reduced to a "farce or a sham. '8 6 If
counsel's failure to make careful factual and legal investigations, as
distinguished from his trial strategy and tactical decisions, results in
the withdrawal of a "crucial defense," then the defendant has been in-
adequately represented. 87 The same principles apply to counsel's duties
at the pretrial level when advising a defendant how to plead. 8  At the
79. See 2 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE COURTS 81 (1965). In a study of six California counties, the number of de-
fendants who retained their own counsel in 1962 in felony cases ranged from a low of
ten percent to a high of thirty-six percent, while the percentage of defendants found
indigent varied from sixty-one to ninety percent with a statewide average of sixty-nine
percent.
80. People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 123, 465 P.2d 44, 47, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156,
159 (1970).
81. Id.
82. See People v. Williams, 2 Cal. 3d 894, 906, 471 P.2d 1008, 1015-16, 88
Cal. Rptr. 208, 215-16 (1970).
83. See id. at 905, 471 P.2d at 1015, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 215; People v. Marsden,
2 Cal. 3d 118, 123, 465 P.2d 44, 47, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 159 (1970). The court in
Williams stated that neither a disagreement over the defendant's fundamental right to
testify nor a dispute concerning trial tactics "necessarily compels the appointment of an-
other attorney" but in a few cases could "signal a breakdown in the attorney-client re-
lationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant's right to effective assist-
ance of counsel." 2 Cal. 3d at 905, 471 P.2d at 1015, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 215, quoting
People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 215, 466 P.2d 710, 717, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 173 (1970).
84. See, People v. Simms, 10 Cal. App. 3d 299, 313-14, 89 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11
(1970); People v. Ferguson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 68, 77, 81 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (1969).
85. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 464, 386 P.2d 487, 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866 (1963);
accord, People v. Cortez, 13 Cal. App. 3d 317, 330, 91 Cal. Rptr. 660, 667 (1970);
People v. Silva, 266 Cal. App. 2d 165, 172, 72 Cal. Rptr. 38, 42 (1968); People v.
Batista, 257 Cal. App. 2d 413, 419, 64 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722 (1967).
86. 60 Cal. 2d at 464, 386 P.2d at 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
87. Id.
88. See In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 175, 460 P.2d 984, 989, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784,
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appellate level, the failure to raise crucial assignments of error has
also been held to deprive the defendant of the effective assistance of
counsel."' In any case, the defendant has the burden of establishing
his claim as a demonstrable reality. 90
In applying the "crucial defense" doctrine of Ibarra, the cases
have dealt mainly with the defense of diminished capacity. 91 Counsel's
misinterpretation of the law, resulting in failure to object to evidence ob-
tained in an illegal search, has also been held to withdraw a crucial de-
fense.92 And the Ibarra notion of a trial which was a "farce and a sham"
was invoked in one case in which counsel failed to request an instruc-
tion on the lesser included offense of simple assault, a serious mistake
under the facts of the case.93 But, allegations of lack of preparation
or general incompetence which do not withdraw a "crucial defense",
or reduce the trial to a "farce or a sham" have been held insufficient to
support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 94
There is also a line of authority in California which holds that
claims of incompetency must be raised by the defendant at trial and
generally may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 95 However,
789 (1969) (public defender's failure to research the facts and the law withdrew a cru-
cial defense and permitted the defendant to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit);
In re Hawley, 67 Cal. 2d 824, 827-28, 433 P.2d 919, 921-22, 63 Cal. Rptr. 831, 833-34
(1967).
89. See In re Banks, 4 -Cal. 3d 337, 342-43, 482 P.2d 215, 219, 93 Cal. Rptr.
591, 595 (1971) (defendant's appointed appellate counsel took fifteen months to file the
first brief, twice failed to argue when invited to do so by the court of appeals, and
failed to argue at any time the specific issues raised by the supreme court on two re-
mands); In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 198, 474 P.2d 969, 972, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1970)
(in a case "bristling with arguable claims of error," defendant's court appointed coun-
sel filed a brief with a one page argument which the court found ludicrous and a
twenty page recitation of the facts).
90. E.g., People v. Reeves, 64 Cal. 2d 766, 774, 415 P.2d 35, 39, 51 Cal. Rptr.
691, 695 (1966); People v. Silva, 266 Cal. App. 2d 165, 172, 72 Cal. Rptr. 38, 42
(1968).
91. See, e.g., In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 1042-49, 472 P.2d 921, 926-32,
88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638-44 (1970); People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968); People v. Cortez, 13 Cal. App. 3d 317, 328-332, 91 Cal. Rptr. 660,
666-69 (1970); People v. Welborn, 257 Cal. App. 2d 513, 65 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1967).
92. People v. Coffman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 690-91, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782, 787-88
(1969).
93. See People v. Roth, 228 Cal. App. 2d 522, 530-31, 39 Cal. Rptr. 582, 587
(1964).
94. People v. Kirchner, 233 Cal. App. 2d 83, 86, 43 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221 (1965);
see, e.g., People v. Robinson, 5 Cal. App. 3d 43, 49-50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 796, 799-800
(1970); People v. Batista, 257 Cal. App. 2d 413, 418-19, 64 Cal. Rptr. 718, 721-22
(1967).
95. People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288, 299, 363 P.2d 865, 870, 14 Cal. Rptr. 633,
638 (1961); see People v. Rodriguez, 275 Cal. App. 2d 946, 954, 80 Cal. Rptr. 397,
402 (1969).
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this rule is probably not applicable where the alleged incompetency
arises from activities or omissions unrelated to the conduct of trial.96
In sum, the reluctance to find ineffective assistance of counsel except
in "extreme cases"9 and the fact that the defendant may be deprived
of relief by failure to object during trial, put in question the adequacy
of procedural safeguards surrounding a trial with counsel.
In addition, the Second Circuit raises the issue of an accused who
lacks confidence in his counsel, even though counsel may be fully compe-
tent.98 Having the "means of presenting his best defense" in this situa-
tion may require that the accused represent himself99 because the at-
torney cannot effectively represent an accused who refuses to cooper-
ate.
Additional Fair Trial Considerations
The court in Sharp also rejected the idea that due process, in the
sense of according the defendant a fair trial, required recognition of a
right of self-representation. Fairness is to be predicated on "proceed-
ings which will accord [an accused] the fullest opportunity to preserve
all trial rights and successfully defend against the charges." '  And
the assistance of counsel over the defendant's objection nevertheless ac-
cords him the basic "constitutionally compelled requirements of due
process."1 1 But the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does
not force a lawyer on a defendant under all circumstances and that due
process requirements are satisfied by a knowing and intelligent waiver.
1 2
It has been suggested that procedural due process, besides seeking
to minimize the possibility that an innocent man will be punished, mani-
fests an additional concern-respect for human dignity:10 3  "[T]he
state should keep to a necessary minimum its interference with the in-
dividual's desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best,
96. See People v. Kirchner, 233 Cal. App. 2d 83, 87, 43 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221
(1965).
97. See Grano, supra note 23, at 1197: "Unfortunately, however, an immediate
remedy is not available to correct inadequate representation on a large scale; at most,
the legal remedy of reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel is workable only if
such representation is the exception rather than the rule."
98. See United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966). See generally Self-Representation in
Criminal Trials, supra note 72 at 1499-1502.
99. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965),
quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
100. 7 Cal. 3d at 460, 499 P.2d at 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
101. Id.
102. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
103. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346-47 (1957).
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using any legitimate means within his resources ... ."104 For this rea-
son the Second Circuit maintains that "respect for individual autonomy"
requires that an accused be allowed to proceed "under his own banner
if he makes the choice 'with eyes open'. ' 1°5 This interpretation of due
process is flatly rejected by the California court: "The fairness of a
trial is not to be predicated on any purported right of an accused to
proceedings which are planned, directed or conducted by him. . .. "1-06
The positions of the two courts are not mutually exclusive, how-
ever. Pro se representation may, in a given case, accord the accused
"the fullest opportunity to preserve all trial rights and successfully de-
fend against the charges."107  For example, in prosecutions for crimes
of a technical nature the defendant may be more conversant with the
subject matter than an attorney could ever hope to be. 0 On the
other hand, in trials of a political nature' 09 the defendants may be more
concerned with "maintain[ing] the integrity of their political and moral
commitments"" 0 than with contesting the material elements of their of-
fenses. One such example is the trial of the "Milwaukee Twelve" for
charges arising from their destruction of selective service records. One
writer observed that:
The trial of the Twelve also showed that laymen can achieve a
favorable result in a political case by personally interacting with the
judge, jury, and prosecutor. In so doing, they questioned one basis
for professional representation: that an attorney is better able to
articulate the defendant's position than the defendant himself ...
In political cases where the defense is primarily moral, rather than
legal, the defendant can express his justifications as well or better
than the attorney."'
With regard to a second highly publicized political trial, the Angela
Davis trial, it was also suggested that:
104. People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 208, 417 P.2d 868, 874, 53 Cal. Rptr.
284, 290 (1966); cf. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)
(dictum): "When the administration of the criminal law in federal courts is hedged
about as it is by the Constitutional safeguards for protection of an accused, to deny
him in the exercise of his free choice the right to dispense with some of these safe-
guards ... is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution."
105. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); accord, United States v. Duty, 447 F.2d 449, 450
(2d Cir. 1971).
106. 7 Cal. 3d at 460, 499 P.2d at 496, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
107. Id. at 460, 499 P.2d at 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Private Brands, Inc., 250 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir.
1957) (defendant felt better qualified to cross-examine witnesses because counsel was
not an expert on the chemistry of chloroform); United States v. Redfield, 197 F. Supp.
559, 569 n.3 (D. Nev. 1961) (prosecution for income tax evasion).
109. See generally Self-Representation in Criminal Trials, supra note 72, at
1498-1507.
110. Id. at 1503.
111. Id. at 1504.
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The Angela Davis trial challenges the traditional assumption that
. . . only one attorney-client model is appropriate. As a well-
educated, articulate person, she, like the Twelve, has the intellectual
and verbal abilities to speak on her own behalf.
1 12
Because the abilities of defendants necessarily vary widely, it would
appear desirable for the courts to remain flexible in their determina-
tion of how a defendant may best defend himself.
The California Constitution
Finally, the California court concluded that the state constitution
before amendment" 3 did not confer a right of self-representation."'
The court reasoned that the provision giving an accused the right "to
appear and defend, in person and with counsel" could not be read "in
person or with counsel," and that the provision manifested no intent
that an accused be afforded a right to proceed pro se. 115
Contrary to the court's analysis, such an interpretation would not
have been entirely unreasonable. The California Constitutional Con-
vention rejected a motion to adopt the Sixth Amendment in favor of
the provision in question." 6 Arguably, the delegates felt that the
provision accorded both the right of self-representation and the right
to counsel if the accused was able to pay for it.117 However, all contro-
versy has been eliminated by the recent California constitutional amend-
ment, and the court held that general statutory language'18 similar
to that of the constitution before amendment was to be construed as not
conferring a right of self-representation. 19
The Effect of People v. Sharp
In summation, after examining the federal Constitution in the light
of historical precedents, the express language of the Sixth Amendment,
and due process considerations, the California Supreme Court in Sharp
concluded that the right of self-representation is not constitutionally
compelled. The obvious implication of the decision is that the legis-
lature may then require a defendant in any criminal trial to be repre-
sented by counsel.
Whether the practical problems perceived to arise from pro se
112. Id. at 1506.
113. See note 4 supra.
114. But see note 9 supra for earlier California cases finding a state constitu-
tional right of self-representation.
115. 7 Cal. 3d at 457-58, 499 P.2d at 495, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
116. See J. BROWNE, DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA 294 (1850).
117. Id.
118. CAL. PEN. CODE § 686 (West Supp. 1972).
119. 7 Cal. 3d at 463-64, 499 P.2d at 499, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (Appendix).
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representation will be significantly reduced as a result is debatable. The
actual number of defendants who, in the past, have waived counsel and
proceeded to trial is very small. 2 ' Realistically, the problems of de-
lays and continuances are not likely to be abated-the dilatory tactics
of lawyers are notorious.121  Post-conviction adjudication will con-
tinue to be a problem due to the omnipresent ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. And, obviously, a defendant represented by counsel is
equally capable of disrupting trial proceedings.
An Alternative Approach-Pro Se As A Qualified Right
The alternative position taken by the Second Circuit, recognizing
a federal constitutional right of self-representation subject to qualifica-
tions, 22 is preferable to the approach taken in California.2 3 The
Second Circuit's position balances the interest of the trial court in its
smooth and efficient administration and that of the litigant in presenting
his best defense in the manner he sees fit.'24 If the defendant does
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and does make a
timely and unequivocal request to proceed pro se, the Second Circuit's
position is that his request should be granted and that he should be
bound by the results of that decision. 25 If the pro se defendant
should prove to be abusive, the contempt power is available to pre-
serve order and decorum. In addition, the Second Circuit advises that
district courts offer appointed counsel as a resource to indigent defend-
ants "to the extent that the defendant may wish to make use of his
services. Thus, if the defendant later proves to be incompetent to
proceed pro se, the trial need not be delayed to appoint counsel un-
familiar with the case.
127
120. See 1 L. SVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR iN AMERI AN STATE COURTS 91
(1965). In contrast, the number of pro se defendants seeking post conviction relief
may be significantly higher. One study found that nearly twenty percent of the case-
load handled annually in the federal courts is accounted for by pro se litigants, the vast
majority of whom are state and federal prisoners seeking to challenge the constitutional-
ity of their convictions, the conditions of their confinement or other violations of their
civil rights. Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se
Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 159, 159-60 (1972).
121. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 58 (1972) (dictum) (concurring
opinion): "We are familiar with the common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos-
sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff."
122. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
123. But see Grano, supra note 23, at 1175-1208; 48 N.C.L. Rnv. 678, 682 (1970).
124. See Comment, The Right to Defend Pro Se, 3 TExAs TEcH. L. RFv. 89, 96-98
(1971) for an argument that the right to proceed pro se should always be recognized
as discretionary whether invoked prior to or during trial.
125. Accord, Smith v. United States, 216 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1954).
126. United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1971).
127. See Self-Representation in Criminal Trials, supra note 72, at 1509,
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Limitations Upon the Right to Waive Counsel
An additional safeguard would be a more careful screening of de-
fendants who desire to represent themselves and an insistance upon ap-
plication of definite criteria for determining competency to waive coun-
sel. This would tend to alleviate the problem of appellate court re-
versals due to the unintelligent waiver of counsel and also to encourage
careful consideration of requests to proceed pro se. The problems
created by a failure to insist on compliance with definite standards are
illustrated in the California situation.
The court in Sharp refers to the standards laid down by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court by which a trial court may determine the compe-
tency of an accused to proceed pro se. They require that the defend-
ant have "an intelligent conception of the consequences of his act" and
understand "the nature of the offense, the available pleas and defenses,
and the possible punishments."'
1 2 8
This, apparently, is in line with constitutional standards for
waiver of counsel set forth by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbstr '9
and held applicable in state criminal proceedings. 130  The Court in
Zerbst defined waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege."'131  Because of the fundamental
nature of the right to counsel, the Court emphasized the "serious and
weighty responsibility" of the trial court to clearly determine that this
right is competently and intelligently waived. The determination "must
depend . . . upon the particular facts and circumstances" of the case
and should fittingly and appropriately appear on record. 1 32  In Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 3 3 the Court further elaborated on conditions for
waiver. The Supreme Court spoke of the duty of the federal judge
to "investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the
case before him demand":'
34
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of
the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within
them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible de-
fenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and
all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole
matter.'135
128. People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 703, 464 P.2d 64, 68, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612
(1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972).
129. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
130. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 (1961).
131. 304 U.S. at 464.
132. Id. at 464-65.
133. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
134. Id. at 722-24.
135. Id. at 724.
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Clearly, a waiver of counsel cannot be implied from a guilty plea88 or
from a silent record.
3 7
In applying these standards, the federal courts have relied on the
more general Zerbst test of a knowing and intelligent waiver rather
than on the defendant's apprehension of specific items. 38 The Von
Moltke case is objected to as suggesting "a standard of perfection"
which, applied literally would never result in a competent waiver.'8 9
The case has been distinguished on the grounds that it is "clearly con-
cerned with waiver of counsel occurring contemporaneously with a
plea of guilty,"'140 although the case itself does not appear to rest on
such a distinction. 14' Finally, it is thought that rigid application of the
Von Moltke guidelines might lead to a result inconsistent with that
obtained by applying the Zerbst standard.' 42  Whatever standard is
applied, the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that a waiver was not knowing and intelligent;
43
and the courts will look to the entire record of the case to determine if
a waiver was competent. 4
The California standard for determining competency to proceed
pro se, although less rigorous than the Von Moltke formulations, has re-
ceived a similar treatment. While it is the preferred practice for the
136. See Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945).
137. Carmley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1961).
138. See United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 930 (1970); Spanbauer v. Burke, 374 F.2d 67, 72 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 861 (1967): "It appears that federal courts have looked to the substance of
the Von Moltke formulations, and not to its formulas." But see United States ex rel.
Ackerman v. Russell, 388 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1968); Shawan v. Cox, 350 F.2d 909,
912 (10th Cir. 1965); Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1949).
139. Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 1969), noted in 21
HAsNGs L.J. 1002 (1970); accord, Kreiling v. Field, 431 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1970).r
The rather vague test proposed by the Ninth Circuit in Hodge is "whether the defend-
ant understood the charges against him and was fully aware of the fact that he would
be on his own in a complex area where experience and professional training are greatly
to be desired." 414 F.2d at 1043.
140. Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1969).
141. See 332 U.S. at 722 where the Court in Von Moltke states: "It is the solemn
duty of a federal ... judge to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps nec-
essary to insure the fullest protection of [the] constitutional right [to counsel] at every
stage of proceedings." (emphasis added). See 21 HASTInGS L.J. 1002, 1005 (1970).
142. See Spanbauer v. Burke, 374 F.2d 67, 72 (7th Cir. 1966).
143. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 468-69 (1938).
144. E.g., Townes v. United States, 371 F.2d 930, 934 (4th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Redfield, 197 F. Supp. 559, 570 (D. Nev. 1961). But see Heiden v. United
States, 353 F.2d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1965): "It . . .is the holding in Johnson v. Zerbst,
that the fact that a plea was intelligently entered and that counsel was intelligently
waived must be ascertained at th6 time of arraignment or of waiver and not after the
fact."
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trial court to make a determination of competency at the time a request
to waive counsel is made,' 45 the rule is subject to the qualification
that an appellate court will look to the entire record to determine if the
defendant was in fact competent to represent himself.146  Although
frequently the trial court's inquiry into the defendant's competency
is held to be insufficient, 147 the trial court's decision is a discretionary
matter which will rarely be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
abuse.' 48  One court has concluded that the California Supreme Court
itself, rather than strictly complying with its own standard, "appears to
employ a case by case approach," taking into consideration the back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the accused when the intelligent
waiver of counsel is in issue.
49
Factors considered relevant by the appellate courts to the defend-
ant's competency to waive counsel and, therefore, to his ability to
proceed pro se express administrative and substantive concerns. Given
the interest of the trial court in the orderly disposition of its docket, it is
within the court's discretion to deny requests which threaten de-
lays,150 continuances,' 51 or disruption in the courtroom.' 5 2  The courts
will also consider the defendant's demeanor in court'53 and his per-
145. See People v. Miller, 12 Cal. App. 3d 922, 931, 91 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1970).
146. People v. Kellett, I Cal. App. 3d 704, 710-11, 81 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (1969);
People v. Santos, 245 Cal. App. 2d 337, 339-40, 53 Cal. Rptr. 859, 861 (1966).
147. See, e.g., People v. Witt, 15 Cal. App. 3d 6, 13, 92 Cal. Rptr. 770, 774 (1971);
People v. Ochoa, 9 Cal. App. 3d 500, 506, 88 Cal. Rptr. 399, 403 (1970); People v.
Perkins, 7 Cal. App. 3d 593, 599, 86 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1970); People v. Hill, 268
Cal. App. 2d 504, 511, 74 Cal. Rptr. 180, 185 (1968); People v. Kranhouse, 265 Cal.
App. 2d 440, 447, 71 Cal. Rptr. 223, 227 (1968); People v. Mason, 259 Cal. App. 2d
30, 35-36, 66 Cal. Rptr. 601, 603-04 (1968).
148. See, e.g., People v. Carter, 66 Cal. 2d 666, 672, 427 P.2d 214, 220, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 614, 620 (1967); People v. Perkins, 7 Cal. App. 3d 593, 598, 86 Cal. Rptr. 585,
586-87 (1970).
149. People v. Hill, 268 Cal. App. 2d 504, 511, 74 Cal. Rptr. 180, 185 (1968).
150. See, e.g., People v. Ochoa, 9 Cal. App. 3d 500, 506, 88 Cal. Rptr. 399, 404
(1970) (defendant's request posed a serious threat to the orderly disposition of the
court's docket); People v. Hagen, 6 Cal. App. 3d 35, 49-50, 85 Cal. Rptr. 556, 565-66
(1970) (defendant sought to discharge public defender at a time that would have de-
layed trial for two months).
151. See, e.g., People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 191, 449 P.2d 198, 211, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 262, 275, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969); People v. Nabors, 12 Cal. App. 3d
380, 387, 90 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653 (1970) (defendant made request on first day of trial
and then requested a three month continuance); People v. Washington, 257 Cal. App.
2d 112, 115-16, 24 Cal. Rptr. 478, 481 (1967).
152. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 257 Cal. App. 2d 112, 116, 64 Cal. Rptr.
478, 481 (1967) (request to waive counsel indicated either a deliberate attempt to dis-
rupt trial or a serious lack of insight); People v. Powers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 904, 914,
64 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457 (1967).
153. People v. Siegenthaler, 7 Cal. 3d 465, 471, 499 P.2d 499, 503, 103 Cal. Rptr.
243, 247 (1972); People v. Glaser, 265 Cal. App. 2d 849, 853 n.2, 71 Cal. Rptr. 706,
708 n.1 (1968).
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sonal characteristics, in general, including his age,154 education, 55 pre-
vious experience in criminal proceedings,156 job status,1 57 mental or
emotional stability, 58 and ability to articulate his grievances.' 59 Also
taken into account are extrinsic factors, such as the seriousness or com-
plexity of the offense charged and the penalty sought by the prosecu-
tion.1
6 0
While each case must necessarily turn on its own facts and cir-
cumstances, failure to insist on adherence to a definite standard for de-
termining an accused's competency to waive counsel appears objec-
tionable in at least two respects. First, it has made possible waivers
of counsel either by defendants who lack full understanding of the con-
sequences of their act,' 6' for example, ignorant of defenses or circum-
stances in mitigation which an attorney could profitably have taken ad-
154. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 704, 464 P.2d 64, 69, 83 Cal. Rptr.
608, 613 (1970) (request to waive counsel denied; defendant was twenty-one); Peo-
ple v. Miller, 12 Cal. App. 3d 922, 931, 91 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1970) (request
granted; defendant was twenty-two); People v. Wade, 266 Cal. App. 2d 918, 924, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 538, 542 (1968) (request granted; defendant was forty-two).
155. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 704, 464 P.2d 64, 69, 83 Cal. Rptr.
608, 613 (1970) (tenth or eleventh grade education; request to waive counsel denied);
In re James, 38 Cal. 2d 302, 313, 240 P.2d 596, 603 (1952) (no formal education;
error to accept waiver of counsel); People v. Wade, 266 Cal. App. 2d 918, 924, 72
Cal. Rptr. 538, 542 (1968) (one year of college and schooling in the army; request to
waive counsel granted).
156. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 704, 464 P.2d 64, 69, 83 Cal. Rptr.
608, 613 (1970) (no prior adult record; request to waive counsel denied); People v.
Wade, 266 Cal. App. 2d 918, 924, 72 Cal. Rptr. 538, 542 (1968) (prior representation
before the court, once successfully; request granted).
157. See, e.g., In re James, 38 Cal. 2d 302, 313, 240 P.2d 596, 603 (1952) (itiner-
ant farm hand; error to accept waiver of counsel); People v. Kranhouse, 265 Cal. App.
2d 440, 448, 71 Cal. Rptr. 223, 228 (1968) (certified public accountant and licensed
real estate broker; no error in granting waiver).
158. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 704, 464 P.2d 64, 69, 83 Cal. Rptr.
608, 613 (1970) (plea of not guilty by reason of insanity entered although later with-
drawn; request to waive counsel denied); People v. Jones, 16 Cal. App. 3d 837, 842,
94 Cal. Rptr. 312, 316 (1971) (defendant seemed dull-witted; error to grant motion to
proceed pro se).
159. See, e.g., People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 462, 499 P.2d 489, 498, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 233, 242 (1972).
160. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 704, 464 P.2d 64, 69, 83 Cal. Rptr.
608, 613 (1970) (defendant charged with murder and robbery, and the prosecution
seeking the death penalty; request to waive counsel denied).
161. See Salazar v. Sigler, 441 F.2d 834, 838-39 (8th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opin-
ion) (twenty-one year old Mexican with a ninth grade education allowed to waive
counsel and plead guilty to murder without being informed by the trial court of the na-
ture of the charges, possible defenses, and circumstances in mitigation); Minor v. United
States, 375 F.2d 170, 176-79 (8th Cir., cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967) (dissenting
opinion) (no indication the court explained the range of allowable punishments, possible
defenses, operation of presumption).
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vantage of, or by defendants incapable of intelligently waiving counsel
due to some inherent incapacity. 162 Secondly, a trial judge, who is not
obligated to conduct any kind of comprehensive inquiry into the de-
fendant's abilities, is probably more prone to act arbitrarily in disposing
of requests to waive counsel.
Thus, it would be desirable to insist on compliance with a definite
standard for waiver of counsel in all cases. To this end, the American
Bar Association has proposed:
An accused should not be deemed to have waived the assistance of
counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been com-
pleted and a thorough inquiry into the accused's comprehension of
that offer and his capacity to make the choice intelligently and
understandingly has been made. No waiver should be found to
have been made where it appears that the accused is unable to make
an intelligent and understanding choice because of his mental con-
dition, age, education, experience .... 163
This proposal would require that a defendant be fully informed of all
the relevant circumstances of his case, including the nature of the
charges, available pleas and defenses, circumstances in mitigation, and
possible punishments, in order that he be able to assess the risk he is
taking by proceeding pro se. Only then can he intentionally and know-
ingly choose between the alternatives of pro se representation and the
assistance of counsel. Although this may involve a time consuming
commitment on the part of the trial court, constitutional principles as set
forth in Johnson v. Zerbst'6 4 and Von Moltke v. Gillies'65 require that
the defendant be so informed.
In addition, the proposal would necessitate an inquiry into the in-
dividual's capacity to evaluate the information given him. Clearly the
extreme youth or senility of the defendant, his lack of education or
experience and other factors may preclude him from making a meaning-
ful decision.
A second recommendation is that the finding of the trial court ap-
pear on the record. 166 While this has been urged by appellate courts
in the past, 67 in the absence of such a finding, they have inferred com-
162. See Spanbauer v. Burke, 374 F.2d 67, 70, 77 (7th Cir. 1966) (waiver
held valid although defendant described in mental examination reports as "sociopathic,"
"very disturbed," "extremely dangerous").
163. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 7.3 (Ap-
proved Draft 1968).
164. See text accompanying notes 129-32 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 133-35 supra.
166. See Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 1054 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting
opinion); 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1002, 1007 (1970).
167. See, e.g., People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 790-91 n.5, 336 P.2d 937, 947
n.5 (1959); People v. Chesser, 29 Cal. 2d 815, 822, 178 P.2d 761, 764 (1947).
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petent waivers from the entire record of trial'16 But the requirement
of an intentional, knowing waiver should not be satisfied by a "con-
structive" competent waiver to be inferred after the fact. Also, requir-
ing such a finding, after a comprehensive inquiry into the defendant's
competency, would discourage or at least expedite post-conviction at-
tacks.
Finally, requiring a finding on record would discourage trial judges
from acting peremptorily in disposing of requests to proceed pro se.
While most judges probably do not act arbitrarily, one writer aptly
noted that their prior experience with pro se defendants, their legal
training, and bureaucratic predispositions influence the judges "to deny
such requests through whatever legal means are available."'1 9
Conclusion
In conclusion, although the California Supreme Court in People v.
Sharp held that the right of self-representation is not a federal constitu-
tional right, the better view is that a criminal defendant has a quali-
fied constitutional right to proceed pro se. Support for this position is
found in section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and current federal
statutes, 70 in state constitutional provisions,"7' in the language of the
Sixth Amendment itself, in the fact that the Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that due process does not justify forcing counsel on an ac-
cused who has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to coun-
sel,' 72 and in the fact that presently a trial with counsel is not surrounded
with sufficient safeguards to ensure the defendant the fairest trial pos-
sible.173 Recognizing a qualified right of self-representation balances
the substantial interest of the trial court in orderly and efficient pro-
ceedings and that of the defendant in presenting "his best defense"
and proceeding "under his own banner."
Because pro se representation is open to abuse, however, several
safeguards have been suggested. If the defendant proves to be abu-
sive, the contempt power is available. Greater use of advisory coun-
sel is recommended in order to prevent delays if the defendant for
any reason is unable to continue his pro se defense. Finally, re-
quiring the trial judge, in considering a request to proceed pro se, to
apply definite criteria in determining competency and to make a finding
168. See, e.g., People v. Santos, 245 Cal. App. 2d 337, 340, 53 Cal. Rptr. 859,
861 (1966).
169. Self-Representation in Criminal Trials, supra note 72, at 1498.
170. See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 60-64 supra.
172. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 77-97 supra.
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on the record should tend to discourage frivolous post-conviction claims
of incompetency to waive counsel. Stricter compliance with such stand-
ards would have the additional benefits of safeguarding the funda-
mental right to counsel, protecting the defendant who is incompetent
to waive counsel, and encouraging the trial judge to give careful
consideration to pro se requests.
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